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ABSTRACT 
 
This large-scale study analyses the influence of co-ordination and trust problems on employees’ access to weekly 
home-based teleworking from a combined perspective of transaction-cost theory and new economic-sociology. 
Access is more likely when additional co-ordination and control problems are smaller. Indicators of the so-called 
‘telework-risk’ are ‘time sovereignty’, ‘job autonomy’, ‘job interruptions’ and ‘output-management’, measured 
both at the job category and individual level. In addition, also ‘trust-enhancing’ effects of the social 
embeddedness of the employment relation are studied by looking into effects of ‘past and future duration’ of the 
current employment relation, and the ‘manager’s telework attitude’. Multi-actor data are used, collected in 2003 
among 30 Dutch employer organisations, 89 job categories and 1,114 jobholders. The research shows that both 
co-ordination and trust problems determine who can telework. However, whereas co-ordination problems can 
only be viewed significant job level traits, trust problems play a role at both levels. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the present-day European context, the Dutch service economy is runner in front with 20.6% home-based 
teleworkers among its working population (for definitions and European and American figures, see [12]). ‘Only’ 
9% of the Dutch working population, however, have home-based working days averaging more than one day per 
week [12]. Moreover, access to weekly teleworking within firms appears to be unequally distributed amongst 
both job categories and individual employees [29]. Studies show the larger part of actual teleworkers to be found 
amongst white-collar workers, and to a far lesser extent amongst blue or pink-collar workers [1]. Policy makers, 
senior professional and managerial jobs are shown to be the most likely to telework [19]. Other groups that have 
greater odds of being home-based teleworkers are technicians and junior professionals. Also American 
teleworkers are mainly found in professional and managerial occupations [6]. In general, both European and 
American teleworkers are more likely to be male, higher educated, with higher income levels [11], [6], [1].  
Both from a policy perspective and from a scientifical point of view, it is interesting to see where 
inequalities in telework opportunities spring from. What factors affect an individual employee to have access to 
telework, whereas others are denied this, and how can these differences be explained? Of course, this research 
question was posed before [23], [1] and [30]. Yet, the present study aims to include job characteristics, 
individual employee traits and contextual factors in a comprehensive empirical multi-actor analysis. Moreover, 
the study aims to conceptualise well-known telework problems and issues by using a combined theoretical 
perspective (cf. [18]). 
Looking for an explanation for differences in employees’ telework opportunities, studies often look into 
factors in job suitability or employee teleworkability [1]. At first sight, the overrepresentation of white-collar 
workers amongst the actual teleworking population draws to our attention the importance of the nature of work 
activities. Of course, for some activities face-to-face contact or the presence of non-portable machinery is needed 
full-time, and, obviously, home-based teleworking is not an option. Distance working, therefore, is (often by 
definition) related to ‘knowledge work’ that can easily be done in isolation, since it can be facilitated by the use 
of information and communication technology. ECaTT-estimates [9], however, show present-day technology to 
allow two thirds of the European workers to telework in that they carry out activities of a teleworkable nature for 
at least one day per week, such as writing and telephoning, working at the computer, or with machinery 
controlled by a computer. In the Netherlands, even 73% of the work activities are teleworkable, which means 
that physical presence at the work place is not strictly required (part of the time). Hence, if ‘technological 
teleworkability’ of work activities, that is, the possibility of distance working through the use of IT, were the 
only factor affecting access to telework, far more workers would be allowed to telework, and, likely, would be 
teleworking today. Especially since technological innovations have brought about lower costs for homework 
technologies, technology does no longer seem to be a constraining factor in organisations’ telework decisions 
[25] and [7]. 
Rather than focussing on technological aspects only, however, telework needs to be studied in a broader 
context [18]. In other words, teleworkability may not (only) be a matter of job content or the use of IT. In the 
telework literature, therefore, other aspects are mentioned as well. Generally, studies examining reasons why 
adoption and diffusion of telework have been slow found interest among managers to be low [1]. The limited 
interest amongst managers, who are often key figures with respect to allowing telework, may be explained by the 
idea that teleworking is expected to make their work more complicated [32]. Especially managers’ concern with 
(a) co-ordination and (b) control problems are mentioned as primary barriers [25]. Since remote workers may be 
more difficult to approach than regular workers, and more difficult to monitor directly, without this being fully 
impossible (cf. [21], [8]), many employers are reluctant to adopt teleworking. The (physical) absence of one or 
more workers at the workplace may complicate both managers’ and (co-)workers’ work activities. This 
especially holds true when daily work processes are often disrupted by unpredicted or unpredictable 
contingencies, or when work processes are complex, meaning that many people are involved in the same work 
activity. In these cases, a high level of daily (face-to face) communication and co-operation with managers, co-
workers or customers will be essential for the job being done properly (cf. [25]). Logically, so called ‘co-
ordination problems’ may affect organisations’ efficiency, adroitness, flexibility and productivity, and, hence, 
the success of the organisation.  
Given that workers’ interests may not (fully) coincide with organisational, managerial or co-worker 
interests, teleworkers can be expected to behave opportunistically when not supervised or monitored directly. 
Due to the loss of concurrent control, teleworkers may be extra tempted to act in accordance to their own 
interests rather than in the interest of the employer. During teleworking days they may be distracted from work 
by household obligations, or by other non-work related activities. Without direct control, employees may also 
put less effort in their work or pass on trade or professional secrets to other parties. Obviously, also employees’ 
opportunistic behaviour may reduce labour productivity, or harm the employer in a different way.  
The co-ordination and control (trust) problems associated with telework typically resemble problems 
studied from a transaction cost theoretical perspective [38], [4] and [34]. The appropriateness of employing this 
theory with respect to telework issues, therefore, may be obvious. Applied to the decision for adopting telework 
in organisations, the approach has already proved to be fruitful [28].  
Trust is often believed to be the core virtue of quality telemanagement [25], [15], [17], [10], [16], [36] 
and [20]. However, according to the ‘principal-agent model’ [5], [2] the economic model of man underlying the 
transaction-cost theory, the relation between employer and employee can never be based on trust, or trust alone 
(cf. [27]). Therefore, the trust problem associated with teleworking has to be mitigated by investing in 
transaction management [4]. However, it will be too costly, if possible at all, to solve the trust problem fully. 
Therefore, also the social embeddedness of the employment relation may be taken into account when selecting 
teleworkers, since it is believed to generate trust and, hence, may contribute to a reduction of the trust problem. 
In the present study, this idea taken from the New Economic Sociology (cf. [13]) will be added to the 
explanation. The dyadic embeddedness of the employment relation may provide employers both the possibilities 
to learn from employees’ former behaviour and to sanction their unwanted behaviour [3]. Moreover, also other 
contextual factors, like managers’ attitude towards teleworking may reduce the perceived trust problem (cf. 
[18]). In the present study, insights derived from the existing telework literature, often concentrating and 
expanding on management issues, will be incorporated in our combined approach. 
 
 
2 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
2.1. Introduction  
The transaction cost theory primarily focuses on the management of an economic relation between two parties. 
Although their interests may not always run parallel, the present study considers the employer organisation and 
the (first line) managers as one single party (‘the trustor’). Some of the organisations’ telework decisions may be 
related to certain job categories, whereas others may only concern an individual worker. Therefore, the second 
party in the transaction (‘the trustee’) might either be all jobholders in a particular job category within the 
organisation, or an individual worker. In the present study, both job category factors, and individual worker 
factors will be added to the explanation. 
 
2.2 Problem Potential 
The magnitude of the transaction costs needed to arrive at an acceptable risk level depends on the size of the so-
called problem potential associated with the transaction. On the one hand, the problem potential may include 
unpredicted and unpredictable contingencies, earlier referred to as co-ordination problems. On the other hand, 
the problem potential depends on the risk and consequences of opportunistic behaviour, earlier called the control 
(trust) problem [4]. Since transactions with a higher problem potential induce more costs, organisations will be 
more likely to choose for a more hierarchical governance structure that allows closer co-ordination and control. 
Also with respect to the choice for teleworking, which can be viewed as a hybrid type of ‘make-or-buy decision’ 
(since employees work away from the central office), organisations will be led by the problem potential of 
teleworking, and, hence, by the associated costs. A straightforward application of the transaction cost theory 
would suggest that a high problem potential of a certain employment relation implies an organisation to be less 
likely to allow a job category or an individual employee to telework. However, the choice for distance working 
can be viewed as a new contract added to an existing employment relation. Its associated risks have been 
reduced by the organisation, or accepted already. Therefore, in order to understand differences in telework 
opportunities, we should rather consider the additional problem potential associated with teleworking, than the 
absolute problem potential of the employment relation(s). Therefore, it is likely that employers are more inclined 
to allow employees teleworking when the (perceived) additional problem potential is relatively low. 
  
2.3. Co-ordination Problem Hypothesis 
Employers may be more reluctant to allow employees to telework when severe co-ordination problems are more 
likely. Existing co-ordination problems are even assumed to accrue when work is performed at a distance. Job 
activities may vary with respect to their potential (additional) co-ordination problem. Some job activities demand 
frequent and often unpredictable contacts between co-workers, managers or clients. When workers highly 
depend on each other’s input, knowledge and skills, and, hence, when their assistance is often required, 
employees need to be accessible (available). Teleworking, however, may easily lead to a loss of communication, 
accessibility of workers, feed back and information exchange. The co-ordination problem will also depend on the 
extent to which activities can be planned. Expected or unexpected contingencies, like rush jobs, can disturb the 
work process, often demanding managers and individual workers to reorganise their work activities.  
Also when employees have supervisory tasks, the potential co-ordination problem may be severe. 
Distance working may not only affect their own job performance, but also that of their subordinates. Especially 
since it is their job to facilitate, co-ordinate, motivate and control the work of others, their physical absence may 
bring about problems, such as challenging opportunistic behaviour of subordinates, or failing work activities due 
to a lack of supervision and feedback.  
Given the transaction cost theoretical assumption that a larger (additional) co-ordination problem 
demands higher transaction costs in order to reduce the telework risk, it can be expected that both job holders in 
job categories and individual employees whose work activities can be characterised by a small (additional) co-
ordination problem are more likely to have access to telework than others. More concrete, employees having 
access to home-based telework are expected to be found more often amongst job holders in job categories or 
individual employees whose work is (a) less likely to be interrupted for consultation and by unexpected 
contingencies or (b) amongst employees not having supervisory tasks.  
 
2.3. Control Problem Hypothesis 
With regard to work of some job categories or individual workers, controlling the work process directly is 
always problematic, regardless of the work being performed at the regular work place, or at home. The 
additional risk associated with telework, therefore, may be relatively small. High-grade knowledge work, for 
example, requires high levels of concentration and creativity, which can not be enforced by severe direct control. 
For this type of work a certain amount of freedom is required. Close supervision may even adversely affect 
creativity and productivity. More generally, also in their regular work situation, some job categories or 
individual employees are used to a high degree of freedom. Their sovereignty may either apply to their temporal 
work-location (‘when the work is done’), or to the amount of job control (‘how the work is done’, in terms of 
order, way and speed of doing things). Regarding job categories and individual workers that have more time 
sovereignty and job autonomy already, employers always face a high, but obviously acceptable, trust problem. 
Also mobile workers performing their work away from the regular work place, sometimes using online 
connections during business trips or in the field, experience a relatively high level of freedom. Furthermore, 
when the existing direct control problem of job categories or individual workers is reduced by exercising output 
control [8], meaning that they are controlled and rewarded on the basis of their results (task orientation) rather 
than on actual ‘face hours’ at work (time orientation), the additional risk potential of telework is relatively small. 
Malfunctioning of employees will be punished by rewarding them less, either directly by financial rewards, or 
indirectly by reduced career perspectives. Output management can be viewed as an incentive for workers not to 
behave opportunistically, regardless of them being monitored directly or not, and, hence, reduces employers’ 
need of close supervision (cf. [14]). 
Given the transaction cost theoretical assumption that a larger (additional) control problem demands 
higher transaction costs in order to reduce the telework risk, it can be expected that both job holders in job 
categories and individual employees whose work activities can be characterised by a smaller additional control 
problem are more likely to have access to telework than others. More concrete, employees having access to 
home-based telework are expected to be found more often amongst employees (a) who have flexible working 
hours; (b) who have more job autonomy, including mobile workers and higher educated workers; or (c) who are 
managed on the basis of output (cf. [19]).  
 2.4. Dyadic Embeddedness Hypothesis 
Telework decisions are embedded in an existing employment relation. A long-term dyadic embeddedness may 
imply that, on average, employees can be trustworthier, and, hence, more likely to be allowed teleworking. The 
dyadic embeddedness has two components. First, the history of the current work relation (often referred to as the 
‘shadow of the past’ [4]. A longer work history provides employers the opportunity to judge better whether an 
individual worker is suitable for telework (cf. [3]). This is likely to be an important single factor in selecting 
teleworkers (cf. [25], [35]), especially since selecting employees for teleworking might be viewed a form of ex 
ante control [14], [8] that reduces the trust problem. Moreover, employees who have been working with the 
current employer for a longer period of time are familiar with the norms and values in the organisation, and, 
thus, know what is required with regard to the performance of particular work activities [33], [35]. Second, also 
employees’ future expectations with regard to the employment relation may provide the employer with some 
control options [3]. This control option can be referred to as the ‘shadow of the future’ [4]. In this respect, the 
type of job contract may play a role. With respect to the latter, two ‘trust problem reducing’ mechanisms might 
be possible. On the one hand, one could reason that if the future job tenure is expected to be relatively long 
and/or the employee has good career opportunities, the reciprocity of interests of employer and employee may 
generate trust and loyalty (cf. [4], [27]), and hence, reduces the trust problem. On the other hand, however, a 
temporary contract can also reduce the trust problem since it allows an employer to sanction employees’ 
opportunistic behaviour by not extending the employment relation. This can be viewed as a form of ex post 
control [14]. 
Hence, there is a twofold reason to add the dyadic embeddedness of the employment relation to the 
explanation of employees’ access to home-based telework. First, (a) a long work history with the current 
employer, on average, may reduce the trust problem, and, thus, may increase employees’ likelihood of being 
given access to telework. With respect to (b) the type of labour contract, our expectation is not directed.  
 
2.5. Managers’ Telework Attitude Hypothesis 
What telework risk will be perceived acceptable may differ among individual managers. Some managers may be 
more disposed to accept a certain level of uncertainty (risk) than others (cf. [31]). A positive attitude of managers 
towards teleworking may reflect a higher general trust level towards (tele)workers, which reduces the need to 
invest in transaction management (cf.[34]). It can be expected, therefore, that employees who are supervised by 
managers who are well disposed towards telework, will be more likely to have access to teleworking.  
 
 
3 DATA, OPERATIONALISATION AND METHOD 
 
3.1. Data  
In 2003, unique multi-actor data were collected from 1,114 employees, working in 30 employer organisations, 
spread over 89 job categories. The data collection was part of a larger NWO-research program entitled Time 
Competition: Disturbed Balances and New Options in Work and Care [22]. The research design comprised 
various types of questionnaires. For the purpose of this study, four were used: a written organisation 
questionnaire filled out by the HRM-department; a written questionnaire for each single job category filled out 
by the manager related to the job category under study; a written employee questionnaire; and an extensive set of 
structured questions that were asked in a face-to-face interview with the employee at home.  
 
3.2. The Dependent Variable 
Employees were asked whether they were given weekly access to home-based telework. Based on the 
employees’ answers, a dummy variable was constructed (1= Yes, I do have weekly access to home-based 
telework). In the questionnaire, telework was explicitly not equalled to doing work home after working time, be 
it paid or unpaid. The definition of weekly home-based telework, however, did not include the use of IT. 
Descriptive analysis shows that 28% of the employees in our data set had access to weekly home-based telework 
(see Table 1 below for descriptive analyses of all variables used). 
 
 
Table 1 Minimum score (min), maximum score (max), Mean score (mean) and standard deviation (SD) of variables in the analysis (N=1114) 
Variables N Min Max Mean SD 
Dependent Variable       
Access to Home-based Telework 
(employee) 
1079 0  1  .28 .45 
Control Problem      
Working hours not controlled (job 
category) 
1114 0  1  .44 .50 
Job autonomy (job category) 1114 13  40  22.54 5.05 
Mobile workers (job category) 1114 0  1  .35 .48 
Output related rewards (job 
category) 
1114 0  1  .63 .48 
No fixed schedule (employee) 1114 0  1  .20 .40 
Flexible working-hours (employee) 1114 1  5  3.86 1.41 
Job autonomy (employee) 1114 3  15  11.77 2.34 
Education (employee) 1114 1  9  6.03 2.10 
Output related rewards (employee) 1114 1  5  2.68 1.45 
Co-ordination Problem      .99 
Small chance of work being 
interrupted (job category) 
1114 8  21  12.31 2.65 
Supervisory position (employee)! 1113 0  1  .16 .37 
Small chance of work being 
interrupted (employee) 
1059 6  29  15.40 3.81 
Dyadic embeddedness      
Years with Employer (employee) 1114 0  39  10.45 8.98 
Fixed Contract (employee)! 1114 0  1  .92 .27 
Telework attitude (job level) 1114 23  44  34.8 4.73 
Control Variables      
Organisational size (continuous 
variable) 
1114 33  18078  1677.51 2887.95 
% highly educated in organisation 
(continuous variable) 
1114 3  95  48.18 28.69 
% PC-Use (employee)  1114 1  5  3.89 1.19 
E-mail dependence 1114 1  4  2.87 1.00 
Female worker (employee) 1114 0  1  .47 .50 
Contractual working hours 
(employee) 
1114 0  40  33.77 6.70 
!
= note: descriptive analyses presented for supervisory position and fixed contract  
Source: Time Competition Data (2003) 
 
3.3. The Independent Variables 
 
3.3.1. Co-ordination Problem-Hypothesis 
(a) Potential work interruptions were measured at two levels, i.e., the job category level and the individual 
employee level, using (almost) the same set of propositions, at a five point scale. Managers, of course, were 
asked after traits of jobholders in the particular job category they were responsible for. Ideally, a job category 
consisted of a group of workers having the same type of work activities, time-spatial sovereignty, level of job 
autonomy and benefit schemes. For example, managers were asked to respond to a proposition saying that “job 
holders are often interrupted during work.” At the other end of the continuum it was stated that “job holders can 
go on working without interruption”. Another item in the scale stated: “the work planning of the job holders is 
often disrupted by unexpected contingencies”, whereas the other side of the continuum said “the job activities 
are very plannable”. Other items concerned rush jobs, work interference due to mutual consultations, and work 
activities of jobholders being interrelated. At the job category level, five items were used (Cronbach’s alpha= 
.69). At the individual employee level, six items were used (Cronbach’s alpha= .69). A higher score on the co-
ordination problem scale indicates a lower telework risk. Strikingly, the two scales are significantly (p<0.001), 
but not highly correlated (.14) (see Table 2 below). 
(b) Having supervisory tasks is measured by asking individual employees whether they had supervisory tasks, 
and if so, how many subordinates they were supervising. On the basis of these questions, a dummy variable was 
constructed (1= Yes, I do have supervisory tasks).  
 
3.3.2. Control Problem-Hypothesis 
(a) Both at the job category level and the individual employee level, it was inquired after working time 
flexibility. At the job category level, managers were asked how working hours of jobholders were controlled. In 
case they were not controlled by direct supervision or by technical means such as a time clock, the jobholders 
were considered to have flexible working hours. At the individual level employees were asked whether they had 
a fixed schedule or not. On the basis of their answers, a dummy variable ‘no fixed schedule’ was constructed (1= 
No fixed schedule). In addition, employees could indicate at a five-point scale to what extent they were in 
control over their personal working hours. A high score implies a high degree of time sovereignty. 
(b) Job autonomy was both measured at the job category level and at the individual employee level. The 
measurements, however, varied. At the job category level, 8 items at a five-point scale were used. Job autonomy 
refers to job holders freedom with respect to working hours, work speed, work planning, work order, work style, 
job content, co-operation and quality assessment (Cronbach’s alpha = .84). At the individual level, 3 items for 
job autonomy at a five-point scale were used (.69). These items referred to employees’ individual freedom and 
say with respect to doing the job. A high score represents a high level of job autonomy. The presence of mobile 
workers amongst jobholders in a certain job category was measured by a dummy variable (1= Yes, mobile 
workers present in this job category). In addition to these measurements, also the educational level of the 
employee will be taken into account, as an indicator of a high level of job autonomy of high-grade knowledge 
workers. Educational level is measured as a continuous variable.  
(c) Output management was measured both at the job category level and the individual employee level. At the 
job category level, managers were asked whether jobholders were given a bonus related to their individual, 
group, or organisational performance. On the basis of their answers, a dummy variable ‘output related rewards’ 
was constructed (1= Yes, jobholders are output related rewarded). At the individual employee level, employees 
were asked to respond to the statement at a five point scale stating that “I am rewarded on the basis of a certain 
amount of returns or output”, not necessarily referring to financial rewards. A high score refers to employees’ 
perception of being output related rewarded.  
 
3.3.3. Dyadic Embeddedness Hypothesis 
The influence of the dyadic embeddedness hypothesis was measured at the individual employee level by two 
factors:  
(a) Number of years with current employer (continuous variable); 
(b) Temporary versus fixed contract (dummy variable: 1= Fixed contract). 
 
3.3.4. Telework Attitude Hypothesis 
The telework attitude was measured at the job category level asking managers to respond to 11 propositions 
(Cronbach’s alpha= .75), even when no teleworkers were present in the particular job category. The items related 
to consequences of home-based telework, like (expected) productivity gains, co-worker co-operation, work 
concentration, creativity, corporate identity, learning behaviour, work motivation, employee isolation and 
organisational commitment. A high score on the attitude scale implies managers to be well disposed towards 
teleworking.  
 
3.4. Control Variables 
In order to control for other influences that may affect employees’ access to telework, several control variables 
will be taken into account. First, the organisation questionnaire allows us to control for size of the organisation. 
Due to economies of scale, larger organisation may have lower transaction costs per individual teleworker, and, 
hence, are more likely to allow their employees to telework [28]. In the same vein, second, organisations with a 
higher percentage of highly educated workers, whose work is more likely to be teleworkable, are more likely to 
have introduced teleworking [28]. Third, the influence of the technological teleworkability of the individual 
employees’ jobs will be taken into account. The frequent use of a personal computer may be viewed an indicator 
of technical teleworkability. PC-use is measured at a five-point scale, a high score indicating a very frequent use 
of the computer during working hours. Also the use of e-mail can be viewed as an indicator of technological 
teleworkability. Frequent e-mail use may indicate that employees more often depend on other people outside the 
organisation, or that they are less dependent on face-to-face contact, and, hence, face little (extra) co-ordination 
problems. A higher dependence on e-mail is expected to be positively correlated with having access to telework. 
Since women appear to have less access to teleworking, fourth, the gender of the individual worker will be used 
as a control variable. Fifth, the number of contractual working hours will be controlled for. On the one hand, full 
time workers will have more opportunity to communicate with co-workers and hence, may meet less co-
ordination problems when working from home part of their working week. On the other, remarkably, a recent 
study shows part-timers to be more likely to be given the telework opportunity [30]. 
 
3.5. Method 
Logistic regression analyses will be used to test our hypotheses. We will make use of the ‘cluster option’ to 
control for the influence of the organisation. Since most of the hypotheses are directed, the hypotheses will be 
tested one-tailed (with some exceptions, viz., the effect of temporary labour contract, gender and contractual 
working hours).  
 
 
4. RESULTS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The bivariate correlations in Table 2 show that access to weekly home-based telework especially correlates with 
factors representing control problem issues. Co-ordination problem indicators correlate to a far lesser extent. The 
indicators for co-ordination problems measured at the individual employee level do not even correlate 
significantly at all. The dyadic embeddedness factors do appear to be correlated, although sometimes in an 
opposite direction than was hypothesised. The attitude of the manager towards teleworking is correlated 
positively. In the following, the results of the multivariate analyses will be presented (see Table 3 below).  
 
4.2. Co-ordination Problem-Hypothesis 
The co-ordination problem-hypothesis is only partly corroborated. The chance of work being interrupted only 
appears to be a significant factor at the job category level. Job holders in job categories whose work is less likely 
to be interrupted (due to consultation, rush jobs, or waiting for necessary input of others, for example), are more 
likely to have access to telework. At the employee level, neither the (experienced) chance of work being 
interrupted, nor employees having supervisory tasks are shown to be significant factors. Obviously, access to 
teleworking is rather affected by managers’ perception of jobholders’ potential co-ordination problems, than by 
individual workers’ shop-floor experiences.  
 
4.3. Control Problem-Hypothesis 
Generally speaking, the results of the multivariate analysis are supportive for the control problem hypothesis. 
Both the presence of flexible working hours at the job category level and at the individual employee level have 
positive effects on employees’ telework opportunities. Strikingly, however, job autonomy as a job category trait 
does not predict an individual worker to have access to teleworking, whereas job autonomy as an individual job 
trait does. In contrast to the co-ordination problem, the decision to allow employees teleworking is less likely to 
be affected by job group characteristics, but more by the level of job autonomy an individual worker is given. 
Also the educational level of the individual worker, seen as an indictor of more individual job autonomy, is 
shown to be an important factor in employees’ telework opportunities. Moreover, in line with expectations, job 
categories and individual workers who are rewarded on the basis of (individual, group, or organisation) output 
appear to be more likely to have access to telework than others. Obviously, the trust problem associated with 
teleworking is reduced by ex post control (output control) and, hence, the telework opportunity is more likely to 
be given. Furthermore, in case work activities in a job category also include mobile work activities, all 
jobholders are more likely to have access to home-based telework. By definition, mobile workers performing 
work activities away from the central office have to be trusted. Also, allowing mobile workers to work from 
home before and after their external job activities is likely to be much more efficient and time saving, and, 
therefore, more productive.  
 
Table 2 Bivariate correlations of variables in the analysis (N=1114) 
Variables (1) a (2) (3)  (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) (13) (14)  (15) (16)  
(1) Access to 
telework b  
 1                
(2) Working hours 
not controlled (j) 
.20*** 1               
(3) Autonomy (j) .32*** .41*** 1              
(4) Mobile work (j) .20*** .03 .37*** 1             
(5) Output related 
rewards (j) 
.15*** -.25*** -.13*** .18*** 1            
(6) No fixed 
schedule  
.29*** .13*** .20*** .23*** .14*** 1           
(7) Flexible 
working-hours  
.30*** .18*** .31*** .19*** .15*** .23*** 1          
(8) Job autonomy  .23*** .10*** .19*** .09*** .01 .15*** .20*** 1         
(9) Education  .39*** .24*** .43*** .22*** .02 .25*** .41*** .15*** 1        
(10) Output related 
rewards  
.23*** .07* .20*** .21*** .27*** .20***  .09** .22*** 1       
(11) Small chance 
of work being 
interrupted (j) 
.10*** .06* .10*** .12*** .04 -.05* .14*** -.03 .04 -.04 1      
(12) No supervisory 
position! 
-0.03 -.15*** -0.14*** .11*** .06* .06* -.06* -.13*** -0.04 -0.09** 0.08*** 1     
(13) Small chance 
of work being 
interrupted 
.05 .03 .05* .08** -0.06* -0.02 -0.06* -.06* -0.03 -.11*** .14*** .09*** 1    
(14) Years with 
Employer  
-.11*** -.11*** -.12*** -.13*** .04 -.09*** -0.13*** .03 -0.31*** .01 -.01 -.18*** .06* 1   
(15) No Fixed 
contract ! 
.10*** .15*** .09*** .03 -0.01 -0.01 .09** -0.06* .15*** .01 .12*** .10*** .03 -.28*** 1  
(16) Attitude (j) .24*** 0.19*** .21*** -.11*** .11*** .11*** .12*** .01 .15*** .03 .12*** -.06* .10*** .01 .05* 1 
*: p < 0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***:  p < 0.001  
a
 Tested one-tailed  
j =  measured at job category level 
 
Source: Time Competition Data (2003)  
 
4.4. Dyadic Embeddedness-Hypothesis 
In line with expectations, the number or years with the current employer appears to be a factor in employees’ 
access to telework. Obviously, a long work history generates trust, reducing the need for investing in telework 
management. Having a temporary work contract, however, does not affect employees’ access to telework. 
Possibly, the controlling effect of a temporary contract that was believed to enlarge employees’ chances of 
access to telework is outbalanced by the positive effect of a fixed contract, which was believed to commit 
workers. The dyadic embeddedness hypothesis, therefore, could only partly be supported by our data. 
 
4.5. Telework Attitude-Hypothesis 
Employees working in job categories of which managers are well disposed towards teleworking are shown to be 
more likely to have access to telework than others are. This suggests that not only the trust problem itself but 
also the risk managers are willing to take and the perceived telework-risk determine employees’ telework 
opportunities. 
 
4.6. Control Variables 
In line with expectations, the size of the organisation and the percentage of highly educated workers amongst the 
personnel are shown to increase the likelihood of employees being allowed to telework. This may be attributable 
to economies of scale. A higher number of potential teleworkers within the firm coincides with lower costs of 
telework management investment per teleworker. Also, larger organisations may be better capable of handling 
rush jobs since there are more employees doing the same type of work. Moreover, larger organisations have 
larger budgets to spend on IT and help desk services, enabling the information and communication exchange 
with teleworkers, and hence, reducing the potential telework risk.  
Also the technical teleworkability plays a role. Employees frequently using e-mail are more likely to 
work at home. Frequent e-mail use may indicate that employees already depend on others outside the 
organisation or that they are less dependent on face-to-face contact, and, hence, face few (extra) co-ordination 
problems. The percentage of PC-use by the individual worker as such does not affect access to telework. Also, 
female workers are less likely to be given the telework opportunity. The number of working hours has no effect 
on employees’ telework opportunities. 
 
4.7. The Influence of the Employer Organisation 
Only organisational characteristics, such as, size of the organisation and share of highly educated workers 
amongst its personnel are included in the analysis. Clustering by organisation, however, allows estimating the 
share of other organisational factors in the unexplained variance. About 42% of the unexplained variance are 
shown to be attributable to the employer organisation. This share is significant (p<0.001). Obviously, not only 
job category and individual workers traits may be important but also the organisational culture or environmental 
factors may be of influence. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
The present study shows that both co-ordination and control problems are important factors in employees’ 
telework opportunities. Obviously, when selecting teleworkers, organisations and managers are led by the 
management costs associated with distance working. As such this finding may not be very surprising. However, 
whether managers are led by general job traits, by individual work characteristics, by contextual factors, or by all 
these characteristics often remains unanswered.  
With respect to co-ordination problems, therefore, it is interesting to see that the selection of 
teleworkers is not determined by the actual necessity of individual workers accessibility at the shop floor level 
for assistance, consultation or doing rush jobs. Instead, the decision to allow teleworking is determined by the 
general picture the organisation or manager has of (potential) co-ordination problems of the job category as a 
whole. Four explanations can be given. First, the job category assessment may be more relevant to managers 
than the individual workers characteristics. In order not to privilege some individual job holders, managers may 
judge the teleworkability of job categories on the basis of the most severe potential co-ordination problems 
possible within that job category, despite individual differences. Second, co-ordination problems may be 
considered more important as a group trait than as an individual trait. Co-ordination problems, viz., likely not 
only affect individual workers, but also others. Third, managers might be offering teleworking on the basis of 
their assumptions with respect to the co-ordination problems of jobholders in a particular job category, but they 
may not have a clue what the job is really like for some individual workers. Fourth, when a job category is 
characterised by a small chance of work being interrupted and the work of all group members can be done in 
isolation, organisations may be more inclined to invest in telework management, like information and 
communication technologies enabling distance working (economies of scale).  
   
Table 3 Logistic regression coefficientsa explaining access to weekly home-based 
telework (unstandardised regression coefficients (B) and standard errors (SE 
(B)) (N=1026)) 
 Access to weekly home-based telework 
 B SE (B) 
 
  
Co-ordination problem   
Small chance of work being 
interrupted (job category)  .147
***
 .048 
No supervisory tasks (employee)  -.036 .287 
Small chance of work being 
interrupted (employee)  .029 .027 
   
Control problem   
Working hours not controlled (job 
category)  .573
*
 .268 
Job autonomy (job category)  .027 .028 
Mobile work (job category) b  .726** .251 
Output related rewards (job 
category)  1.153
***
 .301 
No fixed schedule (employee)  .522* .234 
Flexible working-hours (employee)  .325*** .103 
Job autonomy (employee)  .234*** .054 
Education (employee)  .376*** .071 
Output related rewards (employee)  .131* .075 
   
Temporal embeddedness   
Years with employer (employee)  .025* .014 
No fixed contract (employee) b c   .448 .373 
   
Attitude (job category)  .076** .028 
   
Control variables   
Organisational size [reference >400 
employees] 
  
[0-150 employees]  -1.161** .404 
<150-400 employees]  -.349 .287 
% Highly educated in organisation 
[reference >66%] 
  
[0-33% highly educated]  -1.601*** .391 
<33-66% highly educated]  -1.954*** .311 
% PC-use (employee)  -.098 .101 
E-mail dependence (employee)  .296* .129 
Female worker (employee) b c  -.721* .228 
Contractual working hours 
(employee)c 
 -.010 .019 
   
Constant  -13.583*** 1.865 
Model fit Wald Chi-square 
 172.35*** 
Df 
23 
b Dichotomous variable (1=yes/0=no)  
c
 Tested two-tailed 
*: p <0.05; **: p < 0.01; ***: p< 0.001 (tested one-tailed) 
Source: Time Competition Data (2003) 
 
In contrast to the co-ordination problem, the control problem appears to play a role at both the job category level 
and the individual employee level. Job categories and individual workers who are more trusted in the regular 
work situation were also found to be more trusted with respect to distance working. More concrete, employees 
whose time input was not as closely controlled, both viewed as a general trait of a job category and as an 
individual worker characteristic, were more likely to be given access to home-based telework than employees 
whose working hours were controlled more tightly. In the same vein, also output related reward systems, either 
introduced at the job category level or experienced by individual workers, were found to be capable of reducing 
   
the trust problem associated with teleworking. However, job autonomy as a job category trait, obviously, does 
not convince organisations that each single jobholder is trustworthy to such extent that working at a distance is 
possible without investing in telework management. In case individual jobholders were given a high degree of 
job autonomy, however, they were also trusted teleworking. Interestingly, trustworthiness can rather be viewed 
as an individual trait than a job level characteristic.  
From the present study, it can be learnt that, in order to understand who can telework, we have to take 
both the job category level and the individual employee level into account, since both levels add to the 
explanation. The present study also shows that not only job category and individual employee characteristics 
play a role, but also the embeddedness of the employment relation. Obviously, the social context is capable of 
reducing the (experienced) problem potential. First, generally speaking, being familiar with an individual 
worker, and an individual worker being familiar with the employer organisation, implies employees, on average, 
to be trustworthier. Second, also a positive attitude of the manager towards (consequences of) teleworking 
reduces the trust problem experienced, regardless of the actual co-ordination and control problem associated with 
teleworking. Hence, the new economic sociology perspective can be considered to be complementary to the 
transaction cost theory indeed. Altogether, both the use of multi-actor data, allowing us to distinguish between 
general job traits and details of individual jobs, and the building of a comprehensive framework allowing us to 
integrate the reported co-ordination and control (trust) problems in one theoretical perspective can be viewed to 
add surplus value to the existing literature.  
Of course, some aspects of access to teleworking have not been addressed yet. First, our basically 
economic approach did not pay attention to ‘power and status issues’. However, our finding that highly educated 
workers had more access to telework than others may not only have to do with them doing high-grade 
knowledge work, but also with managers’ willingness to delegate power to their subordinates. Distance working 
and self-control used to go together with more authority, prestige and status, and, therefore, were traditionally 
inappropriate for subordinates ([37]). Clerical workers having the same general job characteristics may face 
greater opposition from management to work at home than professionals (e.g. [17], [24]). Second, given that part 
of the unexplained variance in access to telework could be attributed to organisational factors, future research 
may also look into the organisational culture (cf. [36], [28]), or the organisational context, such as labour market 
conditions. Finally, third, also the content of workers’ telework request may influence who can telework. Our 
study showed female workers to be less likely to be given access to teleworking. May be, this can be attributed 
to their motivation for teleworking. Women may be more likely to motivate their teleworking requests by 
mentioning non-work related issues, whereas men may emphasise the need for better work concentration. 
Probably, managers may trust individual employees more when their motivation is work-related (cf. [26] and 
[31]).  
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